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We analyse women’s weekly probabilities of leaving unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics (CR and SR) to 
investigate three questions: a) Why are unemployment rates much lower in the CR than the SR? b) Does the 
unemployment compensation scheme (UCS) substantially lengthen unemployment spells? c) Why are women’s 
unemployment rates higher than men’s?  We find that differences in the behaviour of the individuals, employers and 
institutions in the SR and CR (as measured by differences in coefficients) play a larger role in determining the CR’s 
shorter female unemployment spells than do differences in measured demand and demographic variables.  The UCS has 
only a moderate effect on duration and its impact is greater in the CR.  The difference between men’s and women’s spells 
(in each republic) are explained more by differences in coefficients than by differences in observed characteristics. 




1.  Introduction 
 
The Soviet-type system maintained full employment of labour by centrally setting wages and prices, requiring all able 
bodied individuals to work, and allocating to enterprises funds to provide the needed jobs.  This full employment system 
was maintained in most Central and East European (CEE) countries until the late 1980s, although the requirement to 
work (e.g., for housewives) was not always fully enforced.  In the early 1990s, the CEE economies started the transition 
to a market economy and experienced the shocks associated with the elimination of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance and disintegration of the Soviet market.  During this period, all the CEE economies experienced a major 
decline in output and employment, accompanied by outbursts of high inflation.  Real wages also fell dramatically in most 
of these economies as they devalued their currencies, freed most prices and imposed wage (bill) controls.   
As may be seen from Table 1, the transition was accompanied by rapidly rising and persistently high (double-
digit) unemployment rates in all CEE countries, except for the Czech Republic (CR) where the unemployment rate 
remained between 3 and 4 percent throughout the first half of the 1990s.  As is evident from Table 1, the principal reason 
for the rapid rise in the unemployment rate in all the other CEE countries in the early 1990s was the low outflow rate 
from (long duration of) unemployment in comparison to the CR.  
From a policy standpoint, the first important issue we address is why unemployment spells have been so much 
shorter in the CR, and whether an understanding of this phenomenon could be used in formulating policy for reducing 
unemployment in the other CEE economies.  We investigate the determinants of the unemployment durations of Czech 
and Slovak women using micro data that we collected specifically for the early transition period of 1991-93.  The 
selection of the Slovak Republic (SR) as a comparison country to the CR is an integral part of our research strategy.  
Except for an interruption during World War II, the CR and SR formed one country from 1918 to 1993.  During this 
period they shared a common currency, legal system and institutional framework.  Yet, as may be seen from Table 1, the 
Slovak labour market statistics closely resemble those of the other CEE countries and differ markedly from those of the 
CR.  By comparing the CR and SR during the early 1990s, when the two republics formed one country and 
unemployment diverged so dramatically between the CR and the rest of the CEE countries, we exploit the high variance 
in the data and yet automatically control for a large number of factors that might otherwise cause bias.  Given the 
similarity of labour market outcomes in Slovakia and the rest of CEE, our Czech-Slovak comparison has important 
implications for labour market policy in the SR as well as the other CEE countries. 
The second important issue addressed in this study is whether the determinants of unemployment duration have 
been different for women and men.  The present study complements in an important way our parallel work on Czech and 
Slovak men, whose principal results we cite in this paper for comparative purposes.2  There are several reasons for 
analysing the unemployment experience of women.  First, the communist preoccupation with mobilising the entire 
potential labour force resulted in the CEE economies having the highest women’s labour force participation rates 
(LFPRs) in the world.  Since women comprise nearly half of the labour force, a comparative analysis of women’s and 
men’s unemployment is necessary for obtaining a complete understanding of the unemployment phenomenon in the CEE 
economies.   
Another reason for focusing on women is that the experience of women in the transition economies may be 
different from that of women in the established market economies because women in the transition economies may have 
been adjusting their LFPRs from artificially high levels.  In fact, most observers expected that during the transition 
period, women would decrease their participation dramatically.  However, according to a study by Paukert (1995), the 
withdrawal of women in the early part of the transition was only slightly greater than that of men.3   For example, she shows 
that in the Czech Republic, the labour force participation rates for the population 15 years and older fell from 1989 to 1994 by 
6.4 percentage points for men and 9.6 percentage points for women.  In Hungary the LFPR declined by about 16 percentage 
points for men and 20 percentage points for women over the same period.  In Slovakia the decline was 5.2 percentage points 
for men and 7.7 percentage points for women.  However in Poland, women’s LFPRs declined less than men’s (4.4 percentage 
points for women vs. 7.8 percent for men).  Notwithstanding, in 1994 women’s LFPRs in the CEE countries were still 
high, ranging from 66 percent in Poland to 79 percent in the CR, as compared to a rate of 59 percent in the U.S. in 1994 
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1996).4   Hence, women’s labour market experience is not clearly understood in the CEE countries 
and further analysis of their unemployment experience is necessary to improve our understanding of the principal labour 
market issues and their differences between the Czech Republic and the other CEE economies. 
Third, from the start of the transition observers wondered if women’s unemployment rates would be higher than 
those of men as a result of a gender bias in firing and hiring.  An examination of the basic data reveals no consistent 
relative difference in women’s and men’s unemployment rates across the CEE countries, although there are systematic 
differences within individual countries.  As may be seen from Table 2, between 1992 and 1996 women’s unemployment 
rates were higher than those of men’s in the CR, Poland, and the SR, but substantially lower in Hungary.  While the basic 
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unemployment rates by gender are of interest, the discrimination literature clearly points to the importance of controlling 
for differences in endowments (such as education) when comparing men and women.  An important contribution that we 
make in this paper is to measure differences in the lengths men’s and women’s unemployment spells within the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, controlling for endowments and other explanatory variables. 
A fourth reason for focusing on women’s unemployment experience relative to that of men is that gender related 
wage differentials are changing with the transition.  Whereas under communism women enjoyed higher rates of return on 
education than men, the gap has been closing in recent years as the return to education has been rising faster for men than 
women (see e.g., Flanagan, 1994 and Chase, 1997 for individual studies and Svejnar, 1999 for a survey).  There are 
hence important gender-specific developments in education-related wage differentials that may have important 
implications for the determinants of labour force participation and unemployment durations of women relative to men.  
Finally, the third issue we focus on in this paper is the effect of the unemployment compensation system (UCS) 
on the female unemployment duration in the Czech and Slovak Republics.  We compare these findings with those for 
men in a parallel study (Ham, Svejnar, Terrell, 1998).  In market economies, married women have been found to exhibit 
substantially higher responsiveness to economic incentives than men or single women in a number of areas, including 
labour supply.  Understanding the responsiveness to the UCS of single and married women in the transition economies is 
important since the CEE governments face a difficult trade-off in selecting the appropriate level of unemployment 
compensation.  On the one hand, the governments want to provide an adequate social safety net to ensure political 
stability and support for completing the transition.  On the other hand they want to minimise the disincentives of 
unemployment compensation in order to speed up the transition to an efficient market economy and to reduce the burden 
on the government budget.  We carry out our analysis of the incentive effects of the UCS at two complementary levels.  
First, we estimate the effects of marginal changes in the UCS on unemployment duration using a sample of recipients of 
unemployment benefits.  Second, we estimate the effect of infra-marginal changes in the UCS by comparing the 
experience of UCS recipients and non-recipients.5 
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we briefly describe the salient features of the Czech and Slovak 
UCSs.  In Section 3 we discuss our data and methodology, while in Section 4 we present our estimates of the hazard 
(probability of exit from unemployment) functions.  In Section 5 we compare the experience of recipients of 
unemployment compensation in each republic to assess the effect of infra-marginal changes in the UCS.  In Section 6 we 
investigate differences in the unemployment durations of women across the two republics, as well as differences between 
men and women within each republic.  We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Characteristics of the Czech and Slovak unemployment compensation 
system 
 
Czechoslovakia introduced a UCS in January 1990.  By the time of our study (last quarter of 1991 to the middle of 1993), 
the system was working fairly smoothly.  The implementation of the system in each republic followed the same 
guidelines.  In this section we provide a brief description of the three main features of the UCS: eligibility, entitlement 
and benefits.6  The CR and SR were part of the same country until January 1993 and essentially shared the same 
unemployment system over this period.7 
Eligibility was quite broad as recently graduating students and anyone who worked for at least twelve months in 
the preceding three years was eligible for unemployment benefits in 1991-93.  The exceptions were individuals who were 
fired for cause or who quit jobs repeatedly.  Until January 1992, individuals out of the labour force were also eligible if 
they cared for a young child or a sick/disabled relative, or if they were in the military or imprisoned, for twelve months in 
the previous three years.  This January 1992 change in policy is important for this study since it reduced the eligibility of 
many women. 
Entitlement: In 1991, all eligible unemployed individuals were entitled to twelve months of benefits.  On 
January 1, 1992, entitlement was reduced to six months.  Since there was no "grandfather clause," those who became 
unemployed after July 1, 1991 received only six months of benefits.  All individuals in our sample fall into this category. 
Benefits: For those who worked before entering unemployment, the level of benefits was set in 1991 at 60% of 
the person's previous wage for the first six months of unemployment.  However, individuals who were laid off because of 
major organisational changes had benefits set at 65% of their previous wage.  For both groups, the replacement rate fell 
to 50% in the second six months of the entitlement period.  On January 1, 1992, the replacement rates became 60% for all 
workers during the first three months and 50% during the second three months of their unemployment spell.  Those who 
had never worked before and graduating students received benefits equal to 60% of the minimum wage in the first half of 
the entitlement period and 50% in the second half. 
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Whereas in 1991 there was no upper limit on benefit levels, there was a minimum level set at 1,200 Kcs (60% of 
the minimum wage).8  In January 1992 a maximum level equal to 150% of the minimum wage (180% for those in 
training) was imposed, and the minimum was replaced by the “minimum living standard” (MLS), which is analogous to 
the household poverty line in the United States.9  In fact, an unemployed person was eligible for social assistance 
(welfare) in addition to his/her unemployment benefits if the sum of his/her unemployment benefits and the income of 
other household members was less than the household MLS.  
Once a person’s unemployment benefits expired, he/she was eligible for social assistance if his/her household 
income fell below the MLS.  In practice, a single person collected benefits but the amount depended on whether he/she 
lived at home.  A married person only collected benefits if the combined income of other household members was below 
the household MLS. 
 A significant number of individuals who were ineligible for unemployment benefits registered as unemployed (the 
non-recipients).  Some registered in order to obtain the assistance of the district labour office in finding a job.  Registration was 
also a prerequisite for receiving welfare.  As noted above, those who did not have the necessary work experience in the 
previous three years (or its equivalent before January 1992) were ineligible for benefits, as were those who were fired for cause 
or quit repeatedly.  Further, if a graduating student started a job and lost it before acquiring twelve months of experience, 
he/she was not eligible for benefits. 
There is a great deal of similarity in the features of the Central and East European UCSs, as they were patterned 
after the models of the West European countries.10  Thus, our econometric approach should be useful to those studying 
the unemployment compensation system in other CEE countries. 
 
3. Data description and econometric model 
 
To carry out our analysis, we collected weekly data on a stratified random sample of men and women who registered at 
the district labour offices as unemployed between October 1, 1991, and March 31, 1992.  We followed these individuals 
from the onset of their unemployment spell to the end of their unemployment spell or the end of July 1993, whichever 
came first. 
The sample was selected as follows: First, we randomly selected 20 districts in each of the two republics.  We 
then randomly selected 150 individuals in each district who registered at the unemployment office during the last quarter 
of 1991 or the first quarter of 1992.11  We eliminated observations for individuals who suffered a prolonged illness, were 
ineligible for unemployment compensation, had missing values of variables, or took part in training.12  In the CR, this left 
us with a sample of 1,269 women, 851 of whom received unemployment benefits (recipients) and 418 who did not 
receive benefits (non-recipients).  In the SR, we analysed a sample with 1,120 women consisting of 902 recipients and 
218 non-recipients.  The corresponding men’s sample consisted of 780 recipients and 482 non-recipients in the CR, and 
1063 recipients and 229 non-recipients in the SR.  Additional characteristics of the women’s sample are presented in 
appendix Table A1.13  
We use a duration model to analyse the determinants of unemployment spells.  This model is preferred to a 
regression model because factors such as demand conditions and unemployment benefits change over an individual's 
unemployment spell, and time changing explanatory variables cannot be captured in a regression framework.14  Since we 
have weekly data on the duration of unemployment spells, we denote the hazard function (the probability of leaving 
unemployment for employment) in week r of the unemployment spell as  
 )))|y(rexp(- + (1 = )|(r -1θθλ  (1) 
where 
 . + h(r) +    Z(r)+ g(E(r)) +W  + B(r) = )|y(r 10 θγααθ  (2) 
 
In equation (2), B(r) equals unemployment benefits in week r, W is the individual's previous weekly wage, g(·) is a 
function of remaining entitlement E(r) in week r, Z(r) is a vector of demographic conditions and demand variables, h(r) 
captures the effect of duration dependence on the hazard and θ denotes an unobserved heterogeneity term.  We estimate the 
model given by equations (1) and (2) by maximum likelihood.  The conditional contribution to the likelihood function 
(conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity component θ ) for someone who is still unemployed after r weeks is given by the 
survivor function 
 )).|(v - (1 = )|S(r
r
1=v
θλθ Π  (3) 
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The conditional contribution to the likelihood function of someone who completes an unemployment spell of t weeks is 
given by 
 ).|1S(t- )|(t = )|f(t θθλθ  (4) 
 
Let φ(θ) represent the density function for the unobserved heterogeneity.  The unconditional contribution to the likelihood for 
the spell that ends in week t is then given by  
 .d )( )|1S(t- )|(t  = L(t) θθφθθλ∫  (5) 
 
The contribution of a censored spell is calculated in an analogous manner.  
 Parallel to HST (1998), in order to identify the benefits and wage coefficients we rely on five sources of 
independent variation in these variables.  First, benefits dropped from 60% to 50% of the previous wage at thirteen weeks 
of duration.15  Second, a maximum benefit level was imposed in 1992.  Third, a number of individuals had their benefits 
raised to the minimum level of benefits.  Fourth, unemployment benefits were not indexed and hence we discounted 
benefits by the consumer price index to capture the erosion of the real value of benefits over time.  On the other hand, we 
assumed that the appropriate proxy for the mean of the worker's wage offer distribution is his real wage at the time he 
began his spell.16  Fifth, the replacement ratio was 0.65 for those laid off because of a major plant closing prior to January 
1992. 
 In equation (2), we parameterise g(·) as a linear function of (i) remaining weeks of entitlement, (ii) a dummy 
variable for the last week of entitlement before benefits have been exhausted, and (iii) an exhaustion dummy equal to 1 
for all weeks after entitlement has been exhausted.  To estimate the impact of remaining entitlement on the hazard rate, 
we need variation in remaining entitlement that is independent of other determinants of the hazard function, particularly 
current duration.  However, remaining entitlement is a simple linear function of initial entitlement and current duration 
for women who register for benefits at the district labour office immediately after becoming unemployed, and initial 
entitlement is constant across individuals.  To address this identification problem, we adopt the approach used in HST 
(1998) and exploit the fact that a significant number of individuals wait to register for unemployment benefits after 
becoming unemployed.  For such individuals, remaining entitlement is not a simple linear function of current duration 
and initial entitlement.17  The conditional contribution to the likelihood of an individual who waits T weeks to register 
and then stays unemployed for t additional periods is  
 )).|v(T+-(1)|T(t+ = )|L(t
1t-
1=v
θλθλθ Π  18 (6) 
 As noted above, Z(r) contains variables measuring individual specific demographic characteristics and local 
demand conditions in week r.  The means of these variables are presented in Table A1.  All demographic variables except 
for age are in dummy variable form.  We use three dummy variables for educational achievement, where the control 
group consists of those with only a junior high school education, the basic education required by law.  The recent 
graduate variable is coded 1 if an individual is a graduate within the last year from a university or high school.  The 
marital dummy is equal to 1 for those who are married (formally or by consensual union).  We experimented with three 
variables to account for differences in demand conditions across districts and two republics and a variable to proxy 
differences in market structure.  The first two -- quarterly data on district unemployment and vacancy rates by 
educational group -- vary quarterly over the duration of a spell and across individuals.  The third variable is the real value 
of per capita industrial production in the district in a given year.19  It takes on different values across calendar years and 
across districts.  Finally, we used the ratio of employment in agriculture to employment in industry (manufacturing) to 
proxy differences in market structure across republics. 
 As mentioned above, h(r) captures the effect of duration dependence on the hazard.  Since both remaining 
entitlement and benefits are a function of duration, it is important to allow for flexible duration dependence and 
unobserved heterogeneity (θ).  However, recent Monte-Carlo evidence (Baker and Melino, 1997) suggests that it is 
important to be relatively conservative in choosing the number of parameters describing the duration dependence and the 
heterogeneity distribution.  As a result, we use a polynomial in log duration to measure duration dependence and choose 
the degree of the polynomial using the Schwartz criterion (e.g., Judge et al., 1980), assuming that the degree is less than 
or equal to five.  Further we assume that θ is drawn from a discrete distribution with 2 support points, and thus we use a 
simplified version of the Heckman and Singer (1984b) approach.  We assume that θ is drawn from a discrete distribution with 
2 support points.  Thus we use a simplified version of the Heckman and Singer (1984b) approach.20 
We also estimate the model for non-recipients.  For these individuals, benefits and entitlement are not defined 
and we also do not have their data on previous wages.  Thus we estimate a smaller version of the hazard function 
omitting these variables.  Moreover, we do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the model for 
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nonrecipients. There are two reasons for this.  First, the bias from ignoring heterogeneity is likely to be smaller when the 
explanatory variables do not depend on duration.  Second, we have only a limited amount of data for non-recipients, and 
the likelihood function for male nonrecipients was poorly behaved because of the relatively small samples available for 
nonrecipients.21 
Finally, the estimated parameters of the hazard functions are difficult to interpret.  To provide results analogous 
to those produced by regression analysis, we use our parameter estimates to calculate the effect of a change in a given 
explanatory variable on the expected duration of unemployment.  Since we have data on only a relatively short time 
period after the beginning of the transition, we use a truncated expected duration (ED) 
 ED =  week1 - years 4 = K  where], 4yrs*  4yrs))<Pr(t-(1 + f(t) t [
K
=1t
∑  (7) 
where both f(t) (defined by equation 5), and the term Pr(t < 4) depend on the parameter estimates β and the values of the 
explanatory variables.  We can numerically differentiate this expression with respect to the explanatory variables (or 
carry out the equivalent exercise for dummy variables) to obtain estimates comparable to regression coefficients.22  
 
4. Estimates of the hazard functions for women in the CR and SR 
 
The parameter estimates of the hazard functions for unemployed women in Czech Republic and Slovakia are contained in 
Table 3.  The corresponding results of the expected duration experiments (giving the effect of a change in a dummy 
variable or a 10 percent increase in a continuous variable on unemployment duration in weeks) are contained in Table 4.  
Since models with heterogeneity are better behaved numerically when there are not many insignificant 
coefficients, we have used the following strategy to choose a parsimonious model.  We examined the no-heterogeneity 
results of the full model (shown in Appendix Table A1) and constrained the coefficients to be the same for married and 
single women where this seemed appropriate, given the parameter estimates and standard errors.  Since there is also 
multicollinearity in the demand variables, we included only the ‘most’ significant of these variables in our equations.  We 
then allowed for unobserved heterogeneity in estimating the resulting specification. 
 
4.1 Effects of the UCS 
In this section we will be focusing on the results for recipients, reported in columns 1 and 4 of Tables 3 and 4, and the 
elasticities reported in Table 5. 
Benefits: The weekly benefits coefficients, (constrained to be equal for married and single women in each 
republic based on the results in Table A1) have the expected signs but are insignificant.  The point estimates imply an 
elasticity of 0.21 and .0003 in the CR and SR respectively (columns 1 and 2 of Table 5).  Thus the estimated elasticity is 
larger for women in the CR than in the SR.  Comparing the male elasticities from HST (1998) with the female elasticities, 
in the CR the male elasticity is 0.34 and statistically significant.23  On the other hand, the male elasticity in the SR is 
estimated to be 0.06 and is insignificant.  Thus men may be somewhat more responsive to benefits in the CR, while men 
and women in the SR seem quite unresponsive to benefits.  
Previous Wage: The wage coefficient in the CR is statistically significantly for married women and implies an 
elasticity of –0.71, while the coefficient for single women is insignificant.  We constrained the wage coefficients to be 
the same for single and married women in the SR.  The coefficient is not statistically significant but does imply an 
elasticity of –0.41.  Thus we find that a higher opportunity cost of time only has a statistically significant effect for 
married women in the CR, although the true elasticity in the SR may also be substantial.  Comparing the CR results for 
women to those for men, we note that the wage coefficient for men in the CR is insignificant and implies a very small 
elasticity of –0.01.  On the other hand, men in the SR have a statistically significant coefficient but the estimated 
elasticity is –0.25, which is somewhat smaller than the estimate for men. 
Entitlement: The three entitlement coefficients (remaining entitlement, last week of entitlement and entitlement 
exhausted) generally differ in each republic effect generally differed for married and single women in each republic.  
Beginning with the CR, the coefficients on weeks of remaining entitlement are statistically significant for both married 
and single women.24  There is a statistically significant positive spike in the last week of entitlement for married women, 
while the last week coefficient is negative and insignificant for single women.  Finally the coefficient on the benefits 
exhausted dummy variable (constrained in Table 3 to be equal for single and married women) is negative and significant. 
Taken together, these coefficients imply an elasticity of .41 for married women and 0.37 for single women.  The CR 
coefficients for women are qualitatively similar to those for men in the CR; moreover the male elasticity with respect to 
entitlement of 0.44 is quite similar to those for single and married women.  
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In Slovakia, the remaining weeks of entitlement coefficients are negative and statistically significant for married 
and single women.  Raising remaining entitlement by one week would raise single women’s duration of unemployment 
by about 0.7 of a week and the spell of married women would be lengthened by about 0.5 of a week.  Given the large and 
different base durations of married and single women, the elasticities implied by these coefficients are 0.28 and 0.17 for 
married and single women, respectively.25  It appears that only married women exit at a significantly higher rate in the 
last week of receiving benefits (coefficient of 0.97 in Table 3).  Finally, the benefits exhausted dummy variable has 
insignificant coefficients for both married and single women.  Overall these coefficients imply an estimated elasticity 
with respect to entitlement of 0.17 for married women and 0.26 for single women.  The coefficients on the entitlement 
variables for men in the SR differ from those for women since the last week and benefits exhausted dummies are 
statistically significant for both single and married men.  Moreover, the entitlement elasticity for men is estimated to be 
0.41, somewhat larger than the elasticities estimated for single and married women.  
Overall, the results indicate that Czech women are more responsive to the parameters of the UCS than Slovak 
women.  (Czech women have larger benefit, wage and entitlement elasticities, and married women in the CR have a 
statistically significant wage coefficient.)  Married women seem to differ only from single women in their response to the 
previous wage.  Further, the male and female responses to the UCS parameters appear relatively similar in the CR, and 
both men and women in the CR demonstrate only moderate responsiveness to the UCS when compared to those in other 
countries (see Devine and Kiefer, 1991, Table 5.2).  In our previous work we found that men in the SR were relatively 
unresponsive to the UCS, and these results suggest that women in the SR are even less responsive to the UCS. The 
upshot is that policy makers do not have to be overly concerned with the disincentive effects of the UCS based on the 
results in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
4.2 Demographic and demand variables  
In this section we will discuss the results for recipients and non-recipients and hence examine the values for the 
coefficients of the demographic and demand variables in columns (1),(3),(5) and (6) of Tables 3 and 4.26  We find that a 
woman’s age is not a significant explanatory variable for the probability of leaving unemployment in either republic. We 
find that education does matter in the sense that in both republics those with only junior high school leave unemployment 
at a significantly slower rate than those with more education.  Moreover, the results in Table 4 indicate that this education 
effect is substantial.  This parallels our result for men in the SR but not in the CR; in the CR we found that there was no 
difference in unemployment duration across the different educational groups.  
The estimated coefficients on Romanies (gypsies) are negative, large and highly significant, confirming the findings 
in other CEE countries as well that Romanies have much longer spells of unemployment.  Whereas handicapped women 
have on average about fifty percent longer spells than the non-handicapped in the CR, the estimated effect is large but 
statistically insignificant in the SR.  
The base duration results for single and married women in Table 4, which incorporate all the marital status 
interactions as well as the dummy, suggest that married women recipients stay unemployed longer than single women.  
However, among non-recipients there is no significant difference between the unemployment durations of married and 
single women in the CR (using the coefficient for the marital dummy in Table 3), although there is a significant 
difference among nonrecipients in the SR.  The expected duration experiments in Table 4 suggest that these marital status 
effects are substantial.  Women who recently graduated from school do not seem to have longer spells than women who 
have not recently graduated (with one exception).  Women living in Prague leave unemployment more rapidly than 
women living in other parts of the CR, while recipient women living in Bratislava tend to have longer spells.  This result 
parallels the men’s findings and may reflect the fact there was more activity in Prague than in Bratislava during this 
period.  It has also been hypothesised that since Bratislava is very close to Vienna (while Prague is in the centre of the 
Czech Republic) people in Bratislava had the opportunity to register as unemployed (collecting unemployment or welfare 
benefits) and work in Vienna. 
The coefficients on the demand variables have the expected signs, but in the CR they are only statistically 
significant for the non-recipients.  They indicate that exit rates are positively correlated with higher district level vacancy 
rates and industrial production and lower unemployment rates.  The market structure variable indicates that nonrecipient 
women in the CR who live in districts with a high ratio of employment in agriculture to employment in production ratio 
tend to leave unemployment sooner than those who live in districts with lower ratios.  However the opposite, more 
intuitive outcome is found in Slovakia, where the coefficient is marginally significant at standard confidence levels for 
recipients, as is the vacancy rate variable.  The district unemployment rate and industrial production coefficients have the 
expected sign and are each individually statistically significant for nonrecipients in the SR.  
 
5. Estimating infra-marginal changes in unemployment compensation 
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The fact that we have data on both recipients and non-recipients enables us to answer the interesting question of how the 
unemployment duration of a recipient would change if she were deemed ineligible for unemployment compensation at 
the beginning of her spell.27  Since we have data on both recipients and non-recipients, we can assess what the expected 
duration for recipients would look like if their behaviour were governed by the (estimated) hazard function for non-
recipients, and compare this value to their expected duration using the (estimated) recipient hazard function.28 
Since the variables relating to unemployment compensation are not available for the non-recipients, we use a 
smaller set of explanatory (demographic and demand) variables *nrX  to estimate the hazard rate for the non-recipients. 
Denote the same smaller set of variables for recipients as *rX  and the corresponding parameter estimates for non-
recipients and recipients as *nrβ  and 
*
rβ , respectively.  Using this notation, we calculate  
 
 ( ) ( ),X,EDX,ED1Diff *r*r*r*nr ββ −=  (8) 
where ED(β, X ) denotes the expected duration of unemployment at the mean values of the Xs.  (For the sake of brevity 
and clarity of notation, in the rest of the paper we use X to denote mean values in the expected duration calculations.)  
We describe Diff 1 as “moving someone from being a recipient of unemployment insurance to being a non-recipient.” 
Similarly, we can consider the effect of making a nonrecipient eligible for unemployment compensation at the beginning 
of her spell  
 
( ) ( ).X,EDX,ED2Diff *nr*nr*nr*r ββ −=  (9) 
 
We define Diff 2 as “moving someone from being a non-recipient to being a recipient:” 
 Table 6 contains the relevant parameter estimates and calculated values.  For the CR, we estimate in row 5 that 
moving a woman from the recipient to the non-recipient category would lower her unemployment spell by 11.9 weeks or 
by slightly more than 50 percent of the 21.6 weeks expected duration of a recipient (row 1).  On the other hand, moving a 
woman from the non-recipient to the recipient category would raise the length of her unemployment spell by 11.6 weeks 
(row 6) and hence more than double the length of the 11.5 weeks expected duration of her unemployment spell (row 2).  
 The results for the SR are sizeable but much less dramatic in percentage terms.  In row 5 of Table 6 we estimate 
that moving a woman from the recipient to the non-recipient category lowers her unemployment spell by 18.6 weeks or 
less than one-third of the 61.5 week expected duration of a recipient (row 1).  Moreover, moving a woman from the non-
recipient to the recipient category in the SR only increases duration by 7.7 weeks (row 6) or by less than 10 per cent of 
her expected duration of 92.6 weeks (row 2). 
 These findings on the “infra-marginal” effect (Table 6) corroborate those on the marginal effect discussed above 
in Table 5 in that the women in the Czech Republic appear to be more sensitive to the incentives of the unemployment 
compensation system than women in Slovakia.  Indeed, the results in Table 5 suggest that women in the CR may be quite 
responsive to the parameters of the UCS.  Certainly these estimates of the effect of this “infra-marginal” change in the 
UCS is substantially larger for women in the CR than for men in the CR.  The effect of this “infra-marginal” change 
appears quite similar across men and women in the SR. 
 
6. Analysing differences in unemployment duration between the republics  
 
6.1 Differences across the republics for recipients and non-recipients 
Letting subscripts s and c stand for the Slovak and Czech Republics, respectively, the difference in expected duration of 
unemployment between the two republics may be expressed as: 
 .)X,(ED)X,(EDEDEd ccsscs ββ −=−  (10) 
 
Using the approach developed in HST (1998), we carry out a (nonlinear) Oaxaca-type decomposition to calculate the 
portion of this difference that arises from differences in parameter estimates and the portion that arises from differences 
in the explanatory variables.  Furthermore, we decompose the contribution arising from differences in the explanatory 
variables into a portion that is attributable to differences in demand variables and a portion that is due to differences in 
the other regressors, primarily demographic variables. 
 Column 1 of Table 7 contains our results for recipients in the two republics.  We estimate that recipient women 
stay unemployed approximately 46 weeks longer in the SR than the CR, and that essentially all of this difference is due 
to differences in coefficients.29  Hence, the behaviour of the unemployed women, employers, and labour market 
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institutions is very different in the two markets.  Surprisingly, only about three weeks (6 percent) of this difference arises 
from differences in our measures of demand, which suggests that in future research it will be useful to investigate the 
effect of other measures of demand than the ones considered in this study.  Although demographic variables play a very 
small role in the difference in expected duration, the decomposition shows an interesting twist.  It indicates that the 
difference in the expected durations of unemployment between Czech and Slovak recipient women would actually 
shorten by 1.8 weeks if each were to have the others’ mean demographic characteristics. 
 Column 2 of Table 7 contains our results for non-recipients.  The 82-week difference in expected duration 
between non-recipients in the SR and CR is almost double that between recipients in the two republics.  Now differences 
in the coefficients account for 46.2 weeks or slightly over one-half of this difference, while differences in the explanatory 
variables account for the remainder.  Differences in demand conditions account for 13.6 weeks or slightly over one-third 
of the difference in expected duration that is due to explanatory variables.  The remaining two-thirds of the difference 
that is attributable to differences in the explanatory variables arises from differences in demographics.  Examining Table 
A1 indicates that the much higher proportion of Romanies and those in the lowest education group in the SR among 
nonrecipients is likely the cause of this difference.  The results for women non-recipients assign a significant part of the 
explanation to the differences in the explanatory variables.  In that sense they are much closer to the parallel results 
obtained by HST (1998) for men than are the results for women recipients. 
 
6.2 Differences between male and female expected unemployment durations 
The Oaxaca decomposition of differences in the expected length of unemployment spells of men and women is presented 
in Table 8.  In order to carry this decomposition it is useful to have the same specification for men and women.  Hence 
we re-estimated hazard functions for recipient and non-recipient men in the two republics and present the coefficients 
from this identical specification in Appendix Table A3.  The expected durations for men using this specification are 
presented in Table A4.30 
The first finding in Table 8 is that for recipients in the CR, the difference in the unemployment durations between 
men and women are about 25% of the expected length of a woman’s spell.  Moreover all of this difference is due to 
differences in the coefficients and none of it arises because of differences in endowments.  However, for nonrecipients 
there is no difference in the length of unemployment spells between men and women.  Second, the decomposition 
indicates that in both republics, and for both recipients and non-recipients, the differences in men’s and women’s 
estimated coefficients are more important than differences in their observed characteristics (demographic and demand 
variables) in explaining women’s longer spells.  Among the observed variables, differences in observed demographic 
characteristics play a more important role than differences in local demand conditions, which should be expected given 
that men and women are distributed equally among the sampled districts.  Hence, we conclude that differences in men’s 
and women’s labour supply behaviour, the practices of employers and institutions towards gender are driving the 




Our analysis of the determinants of women’s probabilities of leaving unemployment (and hence their unemployment 
durations) in the Czech Republic (CR) and Slovak Republic (SR) has been motivated by three important facts.  First, 
throughout most of the 1990s, Slovakia and all other Central and East European (CEE) economies, except for the CR, 
experienced high unemployment rates and long durations of unemployment spells.  Second, the slow rise in the 
unemployment rate in the CR and its rapid rise in the SR and the other CEE economies in the early 1990s is primarily 
attributable to higher flows from unemployment to jobs in the CR than in the SR and the rest of CEE.  Third, since 
women represent nearly half of the labour force in these two countries (and in the CEE economies in general) 
understanding of the unemployment behaviour of women is essential for understanding the unemployment phenomenon. 
Moreover, relating the analyses of women and men’s unemployment duration sheds light on the question of why women 
have higher unemployment rates in the Czech and Slovak Republics.  Since until 1993 the CR and SR shared a common 
currency, legal system and institutional framework, they represent an excellent laboratory in the CEE region for 
comparing divergent labour market outcomes while controlling automatically for a number of factors that could 
otherwise contaminate such a comparison.  
We began an analysis of the first two of these facts with an analysis of men’s unemployment duration in these 
two republics in a parallel paper (HST, 1998).  Here we continue the analysis by focusing on the determinants of 
unemployment durations on Czech and Slovak women.  For both men and women, we carry out the analysis using data 
on both recipients and non-recipients of unemployment benefits, thus allowing us to examine the effect of infra-marginal, 
as well as marginal, changes in unemployment compensation.  Furthermore, we decompose the difference in 
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unemployment duration between republics for each gender and recipient group into a portion due to the difference in the 
explanatory variables and a portion due to differences in the coefficients.  Finally, we address the third fact by first 
comparing our results for men and women across the two papers, and second by carrying out a nonlinear Oaxaca 
decomposition of the difference in unemployment duration between men and women. 
Combining the analysis in this paper with that in the parallel men’s paper yields the following results.  First, for 
all but recipient women, differences in the behaviour of the unemployed, the employers and the institutions in these two 
countries (as measured by differences in their parameters) play a slightly more important role than differences in the 
measured demand and demographic characteristics in explaining the much shorter unemployment spells in the Czech 
Republic compared to the Slovak Republic.  For recipient women, all of the difference in unemployment duration across 
the republics is due to differences in the behaviour in individuals, firms, and labour market institutions.  Among the 
explanatory variables, differences in demand conditions were the most important factors for recipient men, while 
differences in demographics were more important for nonrecipients.  
Thus differences in the functioning of the labour markets across republics is very important both for men and 
women and for recipients and nonrecipients.  A full discussion of the factors that are likely to contribute to this labour 
market difference is contained in HST (1998).  Plausible explanations for the difference in the estimated coefficients 
include the much higher level of foreign investment in the CR as compared to the SR, the relatively greater decline in 
military production in the SR, the more rapid growth of small-scale service firms in the CR, and differences in the 
response of the manufacturing sector in each republic arising from differences in the age and location of factories 
between the two republics.31   
 Our second important finding is that the unemployment compensation system (UCS) is generally having only a 
moderate effect on the durations of unemployment of both men and women in each of these countries.  We find that the 
responsiveness of both men and women to the UCS is higher in the CR than in the SR.  This is true for both the marginal 
effect (i.e., the elasticities of the unemployment duration with respect to benefits and entitlement) and the “infra-
marginal” effect (hypothetically switching an individual from recipient status and non-recipient status and vice-versa) 
when we experimented with taking away benefit entitlement from a recipient by “making” him/her a non-recipient. In 
this paper we measured the effect of changes in the UCS parameters on both married and single women in each republic. 
We found that the married women in the CR are somewhat more responsive to changes in benefits and entitlement than 
single women, whereas in Slovakia the married and single women are similarly (un)responsive.  The finding of a higher 
responsiveness of married women in the CR parallels the pattern of behaviour of married relative to single women in 
market economies, while the SR finding diverges from the established market economy pattern.  We also found that men 
and women appeared to be quite similar in each republic in terms of their response to the UCS. However, we note that 
the one exception to the above discussion is the measured effects of the infra-marginal changes in the UCS on women in 
the CR.   
Third, in terms of the effects of demographic characteristics on unemployment durations, we found in both 
republics that age is not a factor but that education matters in that the least educated (junior high school graduates) tend 
to have the longest spells.  This effect is stronger in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic (where education is not a 
significant determinant of the hazard rate for female non-recipients and male recipients).  Romanies, both men and 
women, have much longer spells in both republics.  We found that except for nonrecipients in the CR, married women 
have longer spells than single women.  
The Oaxaca decomposition of the differences in the expected length of unemployment spells of men and women 
indicates that in both republics, and for both recipients and non-recipients, the differences in the estimated coefficients 
are more important than the differences in observed characteristics (demographic and demand variables) in explaining 
women’s longer unemployment spells.  Hence, we conclude that differences in men’s and women’s behaviour and the 
practices of employers and institutions towards gender are dominating the differences between men’s and women’s exit 
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Abraham and Vodopivec (1995), Gora (1993), Jones and Kato (1993), Mickelwright and Nagy (1994) and Puhani 
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3 In the early years, the expected massive withdrawal of women from the labour force actually took place more among women 
in older age groups (those who were eligible for old-age pension) than among women in their childbearing years.  The labour 
force withdrawal of workers entitled to old-age pension was encouraged by government measures destined to combat 
unemployment.  The departure of older workers from the labour force affected women more than men in part because 
female retirement age is five years lower than men’s in most countries. 
4 These rates are based on the working age population of women (15-55 in the CEE countries). 
5 As we discuss below, non-recipients are individuals who are unemployed but do not qualify for unemployment benefits. 
6 We refer the reader to HST (1998) for more detail. 
7 Note that we are not trying to explain the difference in unemployment rates between the two republics on the basis of 
the UCS, and our analysis of the UCS is a separate contribution to paper from our investigation of factors underlying the 
difference in the unemployment rates between the republics.  However, part of the difference in the unemployment rates 
can be explained by different responses to the UCS in each republic.  Interestingly, we find that individuals in the CR are 
more responsive to increases in the UCS than those in the SR, and thus a reduction in benefits would actually increase the 
difference in the unemployment rates. 
8 One dollar was equal to 26-30 Kcs (Czechoslovak Crowns) in the 1991-93 period. 
9 See Terrell and Munich (1995) for a detailed description of the MLS. 
10 See HST for a discussion of the similarities between the different UCSs. 
11 There were 78 districts in the Czech Republic and 38 districts in the Slovak Republic at the time of this study. 
12 We do not include these individuals as their unemployment spell can be lengthened by the training period and their 
behaviour is likely to be different from other recipients.  We cannot analyse them separately because we only have a 
small number in our sample. 
13 The men’s sample is described in HST (1998). 
14 Good references on duration models are Flinn and Heckman (1982), Heckman and Singer (1984a), Kiefer (1988), and 
Lancaster (1990).   Devine and Kiefer (1991) provide a comprehensive survey of previous empirical studies. 
15 Benefits also change when unemployment benefits are exhausted after 26 weeks of covered unemployment.  As noted 
above, a single female qualifies for welfare, although her benefits depend on whether she lives at home.  Whether a 
married woman qualifies, and the amount she receives, depends on her spouse's income.  We cannot impute welfare 
benefits for either single or married women and thus we cannot exploit this variation. 
16 Prices and nominal wages rose by approximately 30 percent from the last quarter of 1991 to the second quarter of 
1993, the period covered by our data (see Dyba and Svejnar, 1995). 
17 One reason that individuals register late for benefits is that individuals usually exhaust severance pay before collecting 
benefits.  Other individuals simply wait to collect benefits; this phenomenon is similar to the less than full take-up of 
unemployment benefits in the United States (Anderson and Meyer, 1997). 
18 Using those who register late potentially complicates the econometric framework.  See HST (1998). 
19 The industrial production variable is available only at an annual frequency.  It is a price-weighted composite of total 
per-capita industrial production in the district in 1991 prices. 
20 In HST we found that the Schwartz criterion always lead to 2 support points for the male hazard function. 
21 To carry out the comparison of recipients and nonrecipients below, we also estimate the small model for recipients. For 
comparability with nonrecipients, we do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity when doing so. 
22 We calculate the expected durations at the mean of the explanatory variables, rather than calculating the mean expected 
duration across the sample (see, e.g., Ham and LaLonde, 1996), since we must use the sample mean values in the 
decompositions below. 
23 In what follows, we compare the female results to the male results in HST (1998).  Since this latter paper has a 
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somewhat different specification of the hazard, there exists the possibility that our reported differences between men and 
women may be a result of the different specifications.  To investigate this possibility, we re-estimated the male hazards in 
each republic using exactly the same specification as the hazard used for women in that republic.  The results are 
contained in Appendix Tables A3 and A4 and readers can verify that the male results for the UCS variables do not 
change if we adopt the female specification of the hazard.  We use these estimates in Appendix A3 in the Oaxaca 
decomposition between men and women below.  
24 Here we are using a one-sided test for single women. 
25 The entitlement elasticity is calculated as follows: Since a one week increase in entitlement would mean a 1/26 or 
3.85% increase in entitlement, we divide the values presented in Table 4 (the duration effect from raising entitlement by 
one week) by 3.85.  This gives us the effect of a 1% increase in entitlement on expected duration.  We then divide this 
number by the relevant base duration and multiply by 100 to obtain the relevant elasticity.   
26 Columns (2) and (5) of these tables show the results for the recipients of using the smaller model that we use when we 
compare recipients to nonrecipients to obtain the infra-marginal effect of the UCS. 
27 One could of course address this question by using the estimates for recipients, and setting benefits, as well as 
entitlement, equal to zero.  However, that approach would entail extrapolating these variables well beyond the experience 
of anyone in the recipient group, and raises some difficulties in separating duration dependence from entitlement effects.  
28 In this exercise, we are not controlling for possible unobserved differences between recipients and non-recipients.  In 
order to do so, we would need a variable that affects recipient status but does not affect duration (see Ham and LaLonde, 
1996).  We have not been able to find such a variable. 
29 Note that we are using our sample mean values of the explanatory variables rather than the republic means.  The 
former will differ from the latter since our sample is first stratified across districts.  While it would be preferable to use 
the republic means, they are not available for this time period, and thus we use the sample means.  We will address this 
issue in future work. 
30 We will not discuss these results since they are very similar to those discussed in our parallel study.  We present them 
to enable the reader to compare them with those obtained in the parallel study.  
31 The Czech factories were older than those in the SR, but their locations were determined primarily by market forces, 
while the location of factories in the SR was determined primarily by central planning. 
